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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors, 
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities of Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
■ scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
■ identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
• discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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This paper constitutes the first detailed comparative study of Southern health 
care systems. It begins by analysing the reforms they underwent during the 
seventies and eighties, that is, the introduction of national health services in 
Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain. It deals with the main policy actors involved 
in the design and implementation of the reforms. The second section of the 
paper assesses the measures adopted by Southern health care systems in order to 
contain the cost of health care services in the nineties. It is argued that the 
character of the cost-containment measures adopted in each country has 
depended intensely on the successes and failures of the previous set of reforms. 
The third section considers the impact of the two reform waves on the macro- 
institutional framework of Southern health care systems, as compared to those of 
other European Union members. Finally, the main factors accounting for reform 
trajectories are singled out and the “Southern model of welfare” discussed in 
what regards health care.
1 would like to thank the European University Institute and the European Forum (Florence, 
























































































































































































All Southern European countries have enacted reform laws during the last 
twenty years with the intention of turning their social insurance health care 
systems into national health services. Presently, all four countries are making 
important structural changes in how health care is provided and financed. 
However, no comparative study on the reform of Southern health care systems 
has been done so far. The aim of this paper is precisely to address this issue 
comparatively in order to find out which have been the results of reform and to 
single out which factors have been most influential.
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece were relatively late in adopting 
something akin to the national health service model (see table 1). Great Britain 
introduced its National Health Service in 1946; Sweden followed suit. Norway, 
Finland and Denmark reformed their health care systems in the same direction in 
the subsequent decades. So far, it is only the UK, Ireland, the Nordic countries 
and the Southern ones who have adopted national health services; the rest of 
Western European countries having remained social insurance health care 
systems. Moreover, coverage is only universal in Ireland for hospital care and 
the reforms undertaken in Great Britain since the early nineties make the 
classification of the British system as a traditional national health service 
problematic.










"  This text is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Forum Conference on 
“Beyond the Health Care State: Institutional Innovations and New Priorities in Access, 
Coverage and Provision of Health Services”, 26-27 February 1999, at the European 
University Institute. The conference was organised by Maurizio Ferrera (University of Pavia), 
Ana Guillen (University of Oviedo) and August Oesterle (Vienna University of Economics 



























































































» Ferrera (1996), building on the existence of a specific welfare model in Southern 
countries, argues that a significant difference between their health care systems 
and the more traditional national health services is that reminiscences from the 
(occupational) past are more marked in the Southern countries. Thus, the 
criterion of coverage is not fully homogeneous, as it should be in a universal, 
citizen-oriented system. Moreover, an overlapping between the public and 
private sectors still persists with negative consequences for the functioning of 
the systems. This paper will explore such differences.
• The ambition of all Southern European countries from the seventies 
onwards was to move quickly to a national health service directed to all citizens 
and financed out of general taxation. However, the degree of implementation of 
the corresponding reform laws has varied a lot among them. While it has been 
high in Italy and Spain, Portugal and Greece have failed to put into practice 
many of the legally designed measures (Ferrera 1996; Guillen and Cabiedes 
1997). Variations in implementation processes in Southern European countries 
have affected significantly the next set of reforms, i.e., the so-called “reform of 
the reform”. This is why the first section of this paper is devoted to the analysis 
of the introduction of national health services in Southern Europe and to their 
achievements and shortcomings.
The second wave of reforms has entailed the introduction of measures 
aimed mainly at pursuing increased efficiency and cost-control. The array of 
changes undertaken in this direction -as it has also been the case in other 
European countries - is very large and varied and can be divided into measures 
affecting the demand or the supply side of health care systems. Both have 
different implications and impacts on equity and efficiency. Measures affecting 
the demand side have usually proved negative for equity of access and result and 
not necessarily positive for efficacy and efficiency gains. Conversely, measures 
applied to the allocation and production side of the health system may result in 
increased efficiency while being less aggressive with equity (Saltman and 
Figueras 1997). The second section of this paper deals with the analysis of the 
“reforms of the reforms”. It studies the kind of measures introduced into the 
health care systems and aims at explaining why they differed from country to 
country. The influence of the internationalization and European integration 
processes receives privileged attention.
Finally, the third section is devoted to the impact of the reform processes 
on the macro-institutional structure of Southern health care systems. In 
particular, it deals with the changes that have taken place in terms of the 
criterion and span of coverage; expenditure trends and financing mechanisms; 
services provided and access to them; and organization/management. 




























































































Southern health care systems and the implications for the “Southern European 
model of welfare”.
1. TOWARDS NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES
This section examines the decision-processes leading to the introduction of 
national health services in Southern Europe and its implementation with the aim 
of establishing what the situation was when the second wave of reforms were 
undertaken.
■* Portugal was, together with Italy, the first country to pass a law 
establishing a national health service in the late seventies. Already during the 
early seventies, a move towards a greater role of the state regarding the 
provision of health services may be ascertained. During Caetano’s Estado 
Social, social security coverage was expanded to new categories of workers, the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare was re-organized and new health centres were 
built (Guibentif 1997). In 1971, a health law was passed aimed at securing a 
unified direction, better planning, and co-ordination of health administration. 
The government was to take the lead over the private sector. Furthermore, the 
reform aimed at developing preventive care and at offering citizens a full range 
of health services (OECD 1994). Even though little change was actually 
achieved with respect of the previous statu quo of the health care system, a 
move towards greater government intervention eased the way for the 
developments that were to take place after the 1974 revolution.
In 1974, the overturn of the Salazar regime by army officers was welcome 
by a large proportion of the population who wanted to see an end to the 
authoritarian regime and had hopes that the advent of democracy would render 
positive effects for economic development (Guibentif 1997). The new regime 
was pushed into expansionary reforms of the social protection system because of 
legitimisation needs. In the field of health care, soon after the revolution, the 
role of public sector was increased. Within two years time, central and district 
hospitals owned previously by the misericordias shifted to the public sector, and 
local hospitals were also integrated in the public system. Already in 1977, 
medical units offering services for those depending on poor relief had also been 
incorporated to the public health service. Moreover, social security contributions 
were reduced in the financing of health services in favour of general revenues, 
and the health services of the caixas de previdenza were placed under the 
responsibility of regional health administrations rather than under the insurance 




























































































The new Constitution, passed in 1976, established the right of all citizens 
to health care and placed the creation of a universal national health service under 
the responsibility of the state. The law implementing this principle was passed in 
1979 (Law 56/1979 of 21s1 July). The creation of a national health service had 
been already discussed in the years previous to the revolution and the arrival of 
democracy opened the way for its implementation. The central aim was to 
secure universal, free of charge access to the entire population. The accent was 
put on ameliorating the equity of the system (Pinto 1997).
The 1979 Law set a unified direction of the public health care system and 
established central, local and regional agencies for health services 
administration. Social security services and public ones were to be included into 
the same public network. Insurance funds were no longer to play a role in health 
services, and to remain in charge solely of income maintenance programs. All 
the institutions in charge of preventive and health promotion services were to be 
placed under the centralised control of the Ministry and hospitals were to be also 
centrally co-ordinated. In the eighties, a large proportion of the hospitals and the 
beds came to be owned by the government (80% and 84% respectively). Health 
professionals working for the NHS should all become civil servants. The reform 
law also stated that access to private services should be only possible in the 
cases were public provision was available. Primary care was reformed in 1979, 
so that health centres were to provide, from then onwards, both preventive and 
curative services and to staff an interdisciplinary team of professionals such as 
doctors, nurses, psychologists, social workers and environmental health 
inspectors (OECD 1994).
In spite of this major normative shift within the Portuguese health care 
system, the impact of the legal reform remained far of its formal intentions. 
Implementation was only partial and patchy. Despite the universalist thrust 
embedded in the reform law, several professional insurance schemes were left 
untouched. This was the case of civil servants, amounting to almost 14% of the 
population at the time. The same occurred with many other categories of 
workers, such as bank and insurance employees, persons working for public 
enterprises, the armed forces, and students. Although to different extents, all 
these categories were able to resort to private provision of health care and be 
(partially) reimbursed for it (OECD 1994). Co-ordination between hospitals and 
regional health care administrations was also far from being accomplished, 
“free” health care at the point of service was never achieved, and a significant 
expansion of the private sector took place (Guibentif 1997).
As a consequence of failure at implementation, the Portuguese health care 
system has remained based on three different tiers, namely, the NHS (in 




























































































professional categories (covering roughly one quarter of the population, and the 
private sector (reaching to 17% of the population through private insurance and 
mutual associations) (OECD 1998).
Unfortunately, there is little information on what was the constellation of 
factors that allowed for the passing of the 1979 reform Law and on the different 
positions of the relevant political and social actors regarding this issue. Thus, it 
is also difficult to figure out which were the problems faced in the 
implementation process. Obviously, legitimisation needs of the new regime and 
an already existing consensus among the population could be posed as some of 
the reasons why the reform was passed. One possible reason for difficulties at 
implementation may stem from the fact that coverage was much lower in 
Portugal (66,0% in 1977, according to OECD data) than in Italy and Spain, 
where it was over 90% when the respective shifts towards national health 
services were adopted.
Guibentif (1997) forwards three reasons for the implementation 
difficulties. The first is connected with financial problems experienced by the 
Portuguese social protection system during the 80s, due to generous 
commitments embedded in the social security system that were inherited from 
the previous regime. Nonetheless, such generous commitments were also 
present in Italy and Spain, where implementation was successful.
The second reason is related to Portugal’s entry into the European 
Community. Access to the EC would have fostered the adoption of expansionary 
measures in order to close the gap with more advanced European welfare states 
before actually joining the Community. Still, it would have acted in the opposite 
direction ever since Portugal became a member because attention was driven to 
other more pressing endeavours, such as vocational training. The presence of a 
centre-right party in office from 1985 to 1995, who was not in favour of radical 
moves but rather of careful incremental ones, is provided as a third reason. To 
this Guibentif (1997) adds that social protection reform has never been at the top 
of the agenda in Portugal, contrary to what has happened in other Southern 
European countries, and a lack of influence of civil society, especially on the 
part of unions and employer’s associations. These are all reasons that may 
account for the difficulties at implementing the national health service law in 
Portugal. However, there is little information to be found in the literature on the 
role played by several crucial actors such as health professionals, insurance 
funds (it should be recalled that some of them were left undisturbed) and the 
private health sector. It is not difficult to figure that these were all actors that 




























































































The situation of the Greek health care system in the early eighties 
mirrored to a large extent that of Portugal prior to the 1979 reform. According to 
OECD Health Data (1998), the coverage span was of 88.0% of the population in 
1983, thus much higher than that of Portugal in 1978 (66.0%). However, both 
systems had in common several traits such as administrative dispersion, broad 
territorial inequalities, and variations in both contributory arrangements and the 
services supplied by the different insurance funds. Similarly to Portugal, 
outpatient services were provided mainly by the private sector. Even in the 
hospital domain, the private sector owned more than half of hospital beds 
(Symenidou 1997).
In Greece there were 80 different health insurance funds of compulsory 
membership at the beginning of the previous decade, all directed to different 
professional categories. The rural population, mainly covered by the OGA 
insurance scheme had access to hospital care but only to limited contracted 
services with private clinics, so that access to primary services was problematic. 
IKA insurance, devoted mainly to the urban population, could nonetheless count 
on a much better supply of services, based on free access to hospitals, contracts 
with specialists and a network of clinics owned by the insurance scheme itself. 
The insurance funds covering civil servants, bank employees and workers of 
public enterprises also provided a broad arrange of health services. These latter 
and IKA provided dental, ophthalmology and pharmaceutical services at low 
cost-sharing levels. Contribution levels also varied a lot among the insurance 
funds (OECD 1994).
This situation triggered the establishment of a national health service in 
1983. The perception of broad inequalities in health care resources among 
regions, of mounting differences among the insurance funds, and of lack of co­
ordination among the numerous administrative departments in charge of the 
provision of health care opened the way for the reform. Conscience grew on the 
fact that developments during the 70s had early 80s had rendered privileged 
groups in an ever better position vis a vis the health system. It was thought that 
the establishment of a national health service would smooth out all these 
inequalities, acting above all from the supply side. The Socialist Party (PASOK) 
gained office at the beginning of the eighties thanks to a great extent to its 
commitment to the construction of a full-fledged welfare state. In 1983, the 
Greek National Health Service (ESY) was created by Law 1379 (Venieris 
1997a). The reform was based on the introduction of state responsibility for the 
care of all citizens, entitled to the same range of services, which were to be 
financed out of taxes. Regions were to be in charge of finding out the needs of 
its populations and to provide for them. Family doctors and health centres for 




























































































reform, 186 new health centres were built and the number of hospital doctors 
and nurses increased dramatically (Symenidou 1997).
The reform nationalized the hospital sector and prohibited the supply of 
private services by public doctors. Some efforts were also done at ameliorating 
the supply of primary care in rural areas. However, key provisions of the 1983 
reform were never put in practice. Health services have remained in the hands of 
the insurance funds to a very large extent. Decentralization of authority, the shift 
towards general revenues and the institutionalization of family doctors were all 
aspects that remained broadly untouched (Petmesidou 1996; Symenidou 1997). 
Attempts at decentralization in the early 90s were met with strong opposition 
from public doctors. Primary care in rural areas has remained short of equipment 
and medical staff, while no moves may be ascertained to the updating of primary 
care in urban areas.
Also in parallel with the Portuguese case, the Greek NHS met many 
difficulties for its implementation, above all because a stable coalition of interest 
behind it was not achieved and the necessary public funds needed to put it into 
practice were not allocated. Definition of priorities for reform and planning were 
not either present (Venieris 1997a). Resistance on the part of doctors to the 
introduction of the 1983 reform package and frontal opposition by the insurance 
funds, especially the better off ones, were the main forces impeding a more 
decided implementation process on the part of the government (Symenidou 
1997). Doctors were not interested on the restructuring of the primary care level, 
because such care is usually rendered either by hospital out-patient services or 
private ones. In turn, the richest insurance funds did not want to lose their 
privileges and autonomy. Furthermore, the state of the economy was also 
problematic during the 80s. In 1985, rationalising measures had to be 
introduced. The thrust towards universalism, and past decisions regarding 
expansion of social security benefits quickly resulted in large deficits. Under 
these circumstances, it was difficult to allocate more resources for the public 
health service (Venieris 1997a)
Spain and Italy have been most successful among Southern European 
countries in turning their social insurance health care systems into national 
health services. Just before reforms were introduced in both countries (in 1978 
in Italy and in 1986 in Spain), and despite the time gap, both health care systems 
showed similar characteristics. The organizational structure of the two systems 
was fragmented, although to a much larger degree in Italy than in Spain, posing 
difficulties for a co-ordinated and unitary direction. In Italy, the sistema 
mutualistico was based on a multiplicity of organisms with varied regulations, 
the health funds. Three main types of insurance schemes could be distinguished: 




























































































special schemes for public employees, for the self employed and for particular 
occupational categories; and a special scheme insuring against tuberculosis 
(Ferrera 1989). In the Spanish case, several special regimes existed, together 
with an independent regime for public servants. However, regulations regarding 
the procedures for access to assistance and beneficiaries rights were, though not 
totally homogeneous, less differentiated than in Italy.
The resemblance was remarkable also in other aspects. As a result of 
coverage extension a very large part of the population was entitled to health care 
services: over 90 per cent in both countries. Also in both countries only workers 
and their dependants were insured for health care services. Therefore, part of the 
population had to resort to assistential health care (poor relief), such as some 
unemployed and their dependants, young people in the search of the first job, 
some autonomous workers, and some elders lacking contributory careers. In the 
two cases the health systems were not financed out of general revenues but 
mainly out of fees and contributions. Some other similarities may be pointed 
out, such as the lack of general planning, the slight emphasis on preventive care, 
the expansion of the hospital sector at the expense of increasingly deteriorated 
primary health care networks, and a very deficient co-ordination among the 
levels of assistance. Furthermore, regional disparities in the distribution of 
human and material resources existed in the two countries as well as an 
overlapping between public and private sectors.
Despite the common departure, the 1978 reform in Italy and the 
1984/1986 reform in Spain came to be different in character. In the Italian case 
the reform led to the abolishment of all special regulations and the suppressing 
of the health funds. A single unitary scheme —the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale - 
- was established in its place which covered all citizens and offered all health 
care services (Law 833). The 1978 reform aimed at endorsing the system with 
efficiency, promoting prevention services and reducing the barriers among the 
different levels of care. The parliament was charged with the elaboration of the 
national health plan, and the state was to fund the regions, that, in turn, were to 
transfer resources to the new local health units. These latter, the basic 
organizational piece of the NHS, were to be managed by an elected body.
As Ferrera (1989) notes, what made the Italian reform possible, -and this 
is true of the Spanish case as well— was, in the first place, the establishment of 
the ordinary regions in the early seventies. This set an institutional obligation for 
a broad structural re-organization and it provided political parties with new 
incentives. As soon as they were bom, regions began to fight against the central 
administration in order to force it to accomplish the transfer of responsibilities 
over health matters foreseen by the Constitution. But, as the Italian regional 




























































































government, and especially the Christian Democratic Party, tried to delay the 
institutional transfers and to stop the reformist thrust. However, counter­
reformers tried in vain. The unions, the regions and the left (especially the 
Communist Party) together created such a pressure for reform that a law was 
passed in 1974 contemplating the transferral of jurisdiction for hospital 
assistance to the regions and fixing the liquidation of the health funds for 1977. 
The strengthening of the PCI and its inclusion in the majority coalition in 1976 
had a crucial importance, for this party, ideologically committed to the reform, 
dominated many of the regional governments for which the transference of 
health responsibilities was advantageous.
The weakening of the medical profession due to increasing 
bureaucratization and to internal conflicts greatly reduced the strength of the 
counter-reformist front. Finally, the gradual loss of credibility and viability of 
the health funds because of their lack of efficacy and efficiency helped in the 
same direction (Ferrera 1989). Thus, the role played by the health funds and the 
doctor's associations was radically different from the Portuguese and Greek 
cases, allowing for the implementation of the reform and the inclusion of all 
citizens in the national health service. The pressure exercised by the regions is 
another element of differentiation, for this actor was absent in Portugal and 
Greece.
Nonetheless, the implementation of the 1978 reform in Italy quickly led to 
sharp increases in health expenditure. From 1978 itself until the end of the 
eighties, but especially from 1983, a great number of measures were undertaken 
in order to curb down expenditure. These measures included the introduction 
and further intensification of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and prescriptions, 
controls on the prescriptive behaviour of doctors, and two waves of restrictions 
of the therapeutical catalogue. Co-payments for diagnostic tests and specialist 
consultations were also established and increased during the eighties. Some 
services such as dental care and optical treatments were no longer provided by 
the NHS. Moreover, controls on applications for cost-sharing exemptions were 
tightened by the passing of detailed legislation, which took into account levels 
of income, age, work and family status, types of illness and so forth (Ferrera 
1991, 23). Finally, expenditure ceilings were imposed on the regions and the 
central state took full responsibility for the national health budget. In this way, 
cost-control mechanisms were already established in Italy during the eighties.
In Spain, as I have argued elsewhere (Guillen 1996b), during the 
transition to democracy period (1975-1982) no move may be ascertained in the 
direction of a radical change of model of the Spanish welfare state. Coverage 
rates and expenditure augmented in all policy areas and democratization allowed 




























































































Moreover, aspirations to reform the health care system in the direction of the 
Scandinavian universal model were already present in the seventies. Such a 
move was viewed by the unions, the left and a large proportion of the population 
as equivalent to “becoming real Europeans”. Nonetheless, reform was not 
possible in this period because of the existence of more pressing endeavours, 
above all the reform of the political institutions. The advent of the oil shocks 
also posed difficulties for radical expansion and added uncertainty to the 
situation. Furthermore, the character of the process of political transformation, 
which was based on consensual decisions, meant that time was needed in order 
to achieve agreements. This constitutes a crucial difference with the Portuguese 
case where decisions meaning a departure from the previous situation were more 
easily reached because of the radical rupture that democratization meant. Also 
Greece resembled more the Spanish case than the Portuguese one in this respect. 
In Spain, reforms had to wait until the mid-eighties, some time after the Socialist 
had gained office in 1982. Primary health care was deeply reformed in 1984 
and, in 1986, the initially projected national health ser\’ice was reduced to a 
national health system, which unified the public sector and aimed at protecting 
the entire population gradually. Both in Italy and Spain reforms led to the 
decentralization of the health system, but while in Italy this process meant the 
conferring of administrative responsibilities to all the regions and local powers, 
in Spain wholly independent health services (with their own budget and 
accounting system) were created. However, the process of decentralization has 
been asymetrical in Spain, so that only seven regions have received powers, the 
remaining ten being managed centrally. Consensus on the reform of the health 
care system was reached in the mid-eighties, under the second Socialist cabinet, 
only by forgetting many of the fundamental aspects of the initial plan of reform 
of the government. The General Health Law (Law 14/1996) opened the way for 
the creation of a National Health Service, understood as the grouping of the 
services of the autonomous regions suitably co-ordinated by the state.
The final draft of the reform law was less ambitious in other crucial 
aspects. It contemplated a gradual increase of coverage; the unification of the 
public sector without any modification of the system of coiiciertos (contracts 
with private and non-profit providers); the partial, rather than total, financing of 
the NHS through the state budget; and a very undetailed definition of the basic 
structure of the NHS in order to allow the development of thoroughly 
independent regional health systems. The General Health Law was debated for 
eight months in parliament and was finally passed in 1986 (Guillen and 
Cabiedes 1997; Rodriguez and de Miguel 1990, 238-243). It can be said that, all 
in all, the new law produced little change in the short term, although its 




























































































The reasons for this initially ambiguous result in the Spanish case are 
related to the composition of the reformist and the counter-reformist fronts. In 
fact, the former was only slightly more powerful than the latter, so that the 
reform was enacted but with some deviations from that initially planned. On the 
reformist side, neither the unions (the socialist UGT and the communist CCOO), 
nor the small Communist Party (PCE) could exert much pressure. The unions 
had failed to reach agreements on the reform of social protection with the 
occasion of the tripartite social pacts. Moreover, a confrontation between the 
socialist UGT and the socialist executive took place in 1985 because of the 
enactment of a restrictive pension reform and misunderstanding deepened ever 
since, thus diminishing the influence potential of the socialist union. In turn, the 
Communist Party (PCE) was deeply divided internally and had lost a good deal 
of electoral support since the late seventies (Guillen and Cabiedes 1997).
As for the statu quo coalition, both the health bureaucracy and the 
physicians, especially the latter, were able to defend their views. The 
INSALUD, in charge of the management of health care at the national level, had 
developed gradually into a very powerful, extensive, and rather autonomous 
bureaucratic institution, difficult to control. Its anti-reformist position is not 
surprising given the fact that, in order to achieve co-ordination with the Health 
Ministry, the INSALUD was to be reduced by the reform to a mere resource 
administrator, deprived of planning and economic programming powers. 
Physicians, in turn, although converted into salaried employees to a very large 
extent, had enjoyed a very broad delegated power during the Dictatorship. In 
fact, the medical profession had led the way for the improvement of the health 
system in the sixties and seventies, lobbying at INSALUD, at the Ministry of 
Health, and at the hospitals. Under the shadow of an expanding public sector, 
the share of power given to health professionals and expert physicians had been 
tremendous. Under democracy, although deprived largely of their delegated 
power and having to face unemployment, physicians managed to create new 
active associations. Furthermore, they managed to unite against a reform that 
would mean the loss of benefits obtained thanks to the overlapping of the public 
and private sectors. The strikes and conflicts organized by the medical 
profession during 1987 are good indicators of their organizational power 
(Rodriguez and de Miguel 1990).
The strength of the anti-reformist coalition in Spain, together with the 
division of the cabinet, accounts for the fact that the projected National Health 
Service was put into practice in an incremental way during the second half of the 
eighties. Already existing high levels of coverage and the inclusion of the 
insured in a unified institution, (the Health Services of Social Security, 
Asistencia Sanitaria de la Seguridad Social) since the late sixties eased 




























































































independent health funds. The economic positive cycle also helped by allowing 
public expenditure growth. Additionally, Spain became a member of the 
European Community in 1986. This new political status fostered the 
introduction of expansionary measures in order to meet EC recommendations 
and to narrow the gap with the more developed European welfare states.
Consequently, in the late eighties, the new territorial organization was put 
in place little by little, health centres were built to substitute the old 
ambulatorios, and co-ordination with the rest of the public networks began to be 
attained. From 1989 onwards, the system began to be financed out of the public 
budget. Also in 1989, the "decree of universalization" was passed, thus ending 
the process of extension of coverage by incorporating former beneficiaries of 
poor relief. Financing came to be done each time to a larger extent out of tax 
revenues, so that the proportion at the end of the eighties had reached almost 70 
per cent.
To sum up, the situation at the late eighties was such that major steps had 
been taken in the implementation of national health services in Italy and Spain, 
while Portugal and Greece had advanced much less on putting reform into 
practice. Full homogeneous population coverage and a move towards financing 
via state revenues had been attained in Italy and Spain, the first especially in 
Italy and the second much more so in Spain. Conversely, the Portuguese and 
Greek systems had expanded public coverage but provision still remained to a 
large extent in the hands of insurance funds and the private sector, thus 
constituting what could be labelled “three tiered systems”. Let us now turn to the 
second set of reforms.
2. REFORMING THE REFORMS
This section is aimed at analysing how Southern European health care systems 
were reformulated in the 90s under the pressures stemming from the Maastricht 
criteria of economic convergence. It is understood here that internationalization 
• has not had a unilateral effect on the health care systems of the South. Rather, 
this is a two-direction road, in the sense that there have been diverse perceptions 
among each countries policy-makers of what kintT of challenges 
internationalization was posing on the existing institutions. Also, different social 
policy institutional sets have reacted in different ways to externaf pressures and 
have had an influence on the kinds of cost-control and efficiency oriented 
policies adopted. Moreover, internal^ politics have been of outstanding 





























































































Demonstration effects and policy-diffusion mechanisms also have to be 
taken into account when analysing the evolution of Southern health care 
systems. Since the British reform of the NHS was enacted in the early nineties, 
winds have swept across Europe on the benefits of managed competition, which 
has become a sort of new paradigm for gaining efficiency while preserving 
equity within health care systems. Managed competition entails the separation 
between the financing/purchasing functions and the providing ones, so that 
competition among providers is enhanced, while maintaining universal access 
and public financing. For this purpose management techniques of private 
character are introduced into health institutions. The following pages include a 
discussion on how and to what extent such paradigm has been incorporated into 
Southern health care systems
In Portugal, despite the broadly unsuccessful attempt at implementing the 
1979 reform, or maybe because of it, moves towards a greater efficiency of the 
system can be ascertained already during the 80s. In 1981, flat-rate co-payments 
were set for consultations and diagnostic tests and also for drugs and hospital 
care in the next year (in this latter case cost-sharing was related to earnings). 
Charges for drugs grew during the rest of the decade, the other charges having 
been suppressed in 1983. All these charges were found to go against the » 
Constitution’s provisions in 1987, but an amendment of the Constitution taking 
place in 1989 opened the way for their réintroduction in the near future (OECD 
1994).
In the mid-eighties, some other measures were undertaken in order to curb 
down expenditure on drugs. In 1986, the size of drug packages was reduced and 
doctors were not allowed to write more than one item per prescription. These 
measures were not very successful; they aroused patient dissatisfaction, they 
made the number of consultations to grow and they did not have much impact 
on expenditure control. Consequently, they were abolished two years later. 
However, since the late eighties greater controls were set on doctors 
prescriptions. In 1988, national regulations were established for private 
providers regarding the use of medical sophisticated equipment (OECD 1994).
As was also the case in all Southern European countries, debate on reform 
of the health care system in Portugal started in the late eighties. The overall c 
perception was that one of the main aims of the 1979 reform, that of achieving a 
better redistribution, had not been attained (Pinto 1997). Other problems 
perceived consisted of inequalities among regions, user's dissatisfaction, 
inefficiencies in the organization and management of the NHS, and mounting 




























































































In the early nineties, several reform measures were both proposed and 
enacted by governments of conservative orientation, under the pressure of the 
European integration process. Some of them bore a radical orientation, such as 
endorsing the private sector with a greater role and fostering individual
• responsibility. Reform legislation was passed in 1990 and 1993 respectively. 
The 1990 Law supported the development of private services, which were to be 
licensed and controlled by the government. Thus, the NHS was no longer 
considered as the main provider of health care services but rather as one among 
several entities, either public or private.
Private health insurance underwent considerable growth already during 
the 80s, so that 5% of the population was covered by private schemes at the end 
of the decade. This growing trend was fostered by the fact that, since 1990, the 
ceiling on tax deductions on all private health expenditure (including private 
insurance and co-payments within the NHS) were removed. Doctors working for 
the public service were offered increased salaries if they agreed on working 
solely for the NHS, but few accepted (OECD 1994). Half of the doctors working 
for the NHS are also engaged on private consulting. The fact that NHS doctors 
have few salary incentives, for their pay is not based on performance or work 
effort but rather on seniority, and the high prices of private services set up by the 
Medical Association may explain this double engagement. Conversely, a good
* number of independent doctors also work for the NHS. In this way the overlap 
between the public and the private sectors is really pronounced (OECD 1998). 
This overlap, together with substantial tax savings on private expenditure, and 
problems of access to the NHS may account for the expansion of private care in 
Portugal. Moreover, NHS coverage allows for the use of private care services in 
some cases. This situation has led to the flourishing of private services while 
some public hospitals and health centres suffer from lack of equipment and good 
professionals.
Since 1993, when two other reform laws were approved, the approach has 
been to increase the extent of regional déconcentration and, within each of the 
five health regions, to group together health centres and hospitals as ‘units of 
health’. In addition, the NHS is now allowed to provide services directly, while 
there is a move away from public to private insurance. Private insurers receive 
payment from the government for each member, at a rate below the average cost 
per head of the National Health Service. They are then free to contract with 
providers of care. The system thus contains incentives for insurers to contain 
costs. Moreover, management of public centres is to adopt a model more akin to 
entrepreneurial practice. Full-time salaried doctors were allowed by the 1993 
reform to engage in private practice, if this does not interfere with their public 




























































































The implementation of these reform laws would entail a radical move 
* towards the privatization of the Portuguese public health care system. 
Nonetheless, very few provisions have been put into practice so far. One of the 
most controversial measures included in the 1993 Law was the incentives for 
patients to opt out of public insurance into private one for their entire life span. 
This measure did not succeed firstly because of lack of interest on the part of 
private insurers. Secondly, the replacement of the Social Democratic 
government for a Socialist cabinet in 1995 meant a change in the direction of 
health care reform towards a reinforcement of the NHS capacities. The Socialist 
government seems nevertheless to be committed to endorse public health care 
institutions with more autonomy and to insist on the introduction of managed * 
competition devices between public and private providers (Pereira et al. 1997).
All in all, a lot of legislative activity has taken place in Portugal, but only 
a few measures have been implemented so far, so that the Portuguese NHS has 
remained almost untouched. Furthermore, as regards the measures that have 
been actually put in practice, these have tended rather to incorporate already 
produced changes than to generate reform. This may have been due to the 
declared belief among politicians that an increase in public health care 
expenditure so as to reach the EU mean is desirable and to the power enjoyed by 
the medical profession (Pereira et al. 1997). Thus, reform aimed at cost 
containment has been scarce in Portugal in recent years.
However, some moves may be ascertained. The most salient one may be 
the increase of patient cost-sharing introduced in 1992, although co-payments * 
have not been raised since that date. Also, it has been agreed that NHS 
contracted services should rise below inflation rates and waiting lists for 
specialist care have grown (Pereira et al. 1997). Some experimental measures 
have been also undertaken regarding the use of diagnostic-related groups for 
hospital budgeting. Nonetheless, hospital budgets have remained broadly based 
on historical costs and overspending is automatically covered by government 
allocations.
A very relevant social pact was reached among the unions and the 
government in December 1996, providing a basis for a gradual reform of the 
health care service. The Pact acknowledges the need to facilitate access to public 
services and plans to endow the local level with more responsibilities and 
decision capacities. Health professionals are to be paid increasingly by 
productivity standards and abuses at prescription are to be controlled. Evaluation 
criteria for performance of public institutions are also to be set up. In 1997, a 
parliamentary commission also produced proposals for the reform of the health 
care system in the direction of achieving more clear-cut pattern of relations 




























































































contracting agencies, that purchase services for patients, have been established 
as a pilot experiment. Moreover, three hospitals were to be turned into public 
enterprises in 1998.
To sum up, health reform in Portugal has followed a “pendulum strategy” » 
that has resulted in a health care system that never quite reached the status of a 
full fledged national health service neither could it be characterised presently as 
a social security model. Both sets of reforms -that establishing a national health 
service and those related to cost-containment and re-organization of 
management - have suffered from poor implementation. As Pereira et al. (1997) 
note, increased access and improvements in care coverage are among the assets 
of the existing health care system. However, inefficiencies persist together with 
an ambivalent situation of a perception of peaking expenditure and actual 
patterns of spending as if there were no limits. Consensus seems to exist on the 
need to redefine the role of the state in order to endow the government with 
stronger regulatory capacities, to implement a separation between financers and 
providers/purchasers, to deepen the decentralization processes, and to develop 
performance-based payment systems for providers. So far, resistance to these 
changes on the part of health providers has been very strong and the government 
has acted very cautiously regarding implementation. At the moment, discussion 
on the financing and the future of the health care system is taking place and no 
clear agreement has been reached so far.
In the Greek case, Matsaganis (1991, 280) has shown how the 
fragmentation of social health insurance, and the particular ways in which 
sickness funds’ financial services are organized, were still a major source of 
inequity and inefficiency at the beginning of the nineties. The permanence of the 
insurance system is due to a large extent to corporate interests and to the worries 
of the rich insurance funds of reforms implying a levelling of their services. 
Thus, the Greek health care system remained very complex in institutional terms 
and heavily relying on path dependency.
Such was the situation when a conservative government was elected in 
April 1990 and the re-organization of the social protection system had come to 
be considered as a top priority not only by the new government, but also by both 
policy-makers and pressure groups. Moreover, external pressures for the 
rationalization of the social protection system stemmed from the European 
Community conditions for loans. As early as July 1990, an agreement was 
reached among the three main political parties (the Conservative, the Socialist 
and the Left Coalition) regarding the introduction of efficiency measures into 
the health care system. However, the reaction of the trade unions was both very 




























































































September, and the government was forced to forget about radical reform 
(Venieris 1997a)
A second attempt at reform was made in 1992, this time rendering results, 
at least as far as legislative action is concerned. Amendments of the 1983 NHS 
Law were passed which were based on neoliberal ideology. Consequently, the 
role of the public sector in the provision of health care was reduced in favour of 
the private one. Hospitals that had been already nationalized remained under the 
public sector, but non-profit private hospitals became eligible for public 
provision and state subsidies. Doctors working for the public sector were 
allowed to combine their activities with private ones. Still, very few of them 
(around 150) decided to adopt the new part-time contract. Also according to the 
new legislation, primary health care centres were to be financed by local bodies, 
and provisions were made for free choice of doctors and hospitals (be it public 
or private) on the part of patients (Venieris 1997b, 93-94).
During the early nineties, several regulations were aimed at modifying 
organizational aspects, improving emergency services, management of hospitals 
and primary health care. In 1991, tickets were established on out-patient care 
services (1,000 Drs., with a lot of exemptions) and drugs (fixed at 25%, and 
10% for the chronically ill), which meant an increased burden for the family 
budget. Family budgets are also strained because of the existence of corruption 
even within public hospitals, where doctors receive “informal extra payments” 
as a way to get preference treatment (European Commission 1995; Symenidou 
1997). Changes adopted in the early nineties regarding the financing of health 
care have also meant a lot of strains for the insurance funds. Hospital and 
outpatient fees paid by the funds were raised dramatically, making them face 
almost bankruptcy (Venieris 1997b, 94).
The return of the Socialist Party to government in 1993 meant another 
turn in health policy, so that many of the changes introduced by the 
Conservative cabinet were reversed in order to reinforce the NHS. Thus, 
restrictions on private practice for doctors were re-established and primary 
health care centres were replaced under the hospital budgets. The Ministry of 
Health engaged on the elaboration of a thorough reform proposal of the health 
care system. A foreign committee of experts, headed by professor Abel-Smith, 
was appointed and produced a full set of proposals for reform in 1994. The 
committee severely critisized the behaviour of those health professionals 
accepting bribes or gifts from patients or pharmaceutical firms. It was also 
concerned with the absence of incentives for health professionals because of 
bureaucratic regulations, centralization of management, and the poor state of 




























































































The proposals of the expert’s committee also included several measures 
aimed at endorsing the system with more efficiency and fighting users’ 
dissatisfaction. Among them were the development of preventive care, an 
amelioration of primary services through the creation of a network of family 
doctors, and a whole range of measures regarding the introduction of cost 
control devices and new management techniques along entrepreneurial lines. 
The bulk of the reform proposal was aimed at unifying the many insurance 
funds into one single organization and separating the financing, purchasing and 
providing activities of the health care system (European Commission 1995).
Some experts have already indicated their disagreement with these 
proposals for change. For example, Matsaganis (1998) argues that applying the 
new “paradigm” of health care reform, i.e. quasi-markets British style, to the 
Greek case is highly inappropriate. The reasons forwarded by Matsaganis refer 
to exportability problems to a system that is very different from the British one 
in organizational terms and also working in a totally diverse cultural 
environment. In fact, the Greek health care system is a much more fragmented 
one and relies heavily on private provision and these are traits that would pose 
difficulties to the introduction of the fundholding experience. This is why a 
more piecemeal change, which would deal with the inefficiencies of the existing 
system would be preferred.
So far, little steps have been taken in order to adopt the recommendations 
of the Abel-Smith committee, and the bargaining process for the passing and 
implementation of proposals is still under way. Once again, doctors oppose the 
introduction of reform and the government is facing difficulties to build a stable 
coalition of interest around reform. In parallel to the Portuguese case, the Greek 
system has followed a winding strategy for reform and has lacked 
implementation results. As a consequence, as has also been the case in Portugal, 
the Greek Health Care system has remained fragmented in insurance terms and 
also heavily relying on the private sector of provision, when compared with the 
other Southern European counterparts, i.e. Spain and Italy. The thrust towards a 
reinforcement of the private sector and cost-sharing has been nevertheless less 
marked in Greece than in Portugal in recent years. The common developments 
shared by both countries seem to be clearly linked to the ability of the medical 
profession to block reforms. A climate of consensus among relevant actors in 
order to pass reforms and implement them has been for this reason also very 
difficult to reach in both cases.
In Italy, developments in the direction of cost-control during the eighties 
were due to the upsurge of a crisis of legitimisation of the Italian welfare state 
related to the perception of growing inequalities and inefficiency. Within the 




























































































and informal workers, and between the aged and the non-aged. Moreover, 
contribution rates diverged among occupational categories, and many people 
had access to the system through clientelistic means. These inequalities were 
already present before the eighties, but peaking public deficits led to a sharp 
increase in taxation in this decade. This resulted in a situation in which the 
blame for the country's financial trouble was placed on what was thought an 
inefficient and unfair system of welfare. In fact, the 1978 health reform was 
responsible to a great extent for the growing health care deficits of the eighties, 
due to the design of the financing system and the organization of management. 
The need to balance the economy led politicians to introduce cost-control 
measures during the eighties and the debate around the “reform of the reform” 
already started. However, due to political instability, no agreement was reached 
(Ferrera 1997).
The measures undertaken during the eighties, even though unpopular, 
achieved a better control of demand and also financing improvements. 
Nonetheless, and despite increases in contributions, national accounts became 
increasingly unbalanced during the decade, so that public deficit was alarming at 
the beginning of the nineties. In 1992, the lira underwent dramatic difficulties, 
conducive to devaluation and its exit form the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
Italy's credibility at budget adjustment was at stake. Furthermore, fraud on 
exemptions for cost-sharing had grown to worrying proportions This situation 
triggered the adoption of radical policy changes in the health care system, 
among other domains of social policy (Ferrera 1997).
Since 1992, major reforms of the health care systems were passed. Co­
payments and the system of exemptions were considerably tightened in 1993-94. 
More significantly, two legislative decrees approved in 1992 and 1993 meant a 
sharp turn from the 1978 health care legislation (Decree-Laws 502/1992 and 
517/1993). Previously, in 1991, the political management committees of the 
local health units were abolished and uniform levels of care were fixed from the 
centre for all regions. The previously elected bodies running local health units 
were substituted for professional managers depending on a private contract, only 
renewable at the face of satisfactory performance. The same provisions were 
applied to hospitals. Both public hospitals and local health units were allowed to 
be turned into “public enterprises”, obliged to operate with balanced budgets. 
And, also very relevant, responsibility was taken away from the local level in 
order to empower regions. Regional governments have gained significant 
management, planning, financing, and organizational capabilities, to the point 
that the NHS can now develop into 21 different and independent health care 
systems. In fact, implementation of the 1993-94 reform is being done at different 





























































































Conditions for employment of the NHS staff are also being changed in 
Italy in a direction more akin to private contracting, as part of a program 
affecting all civil servants. Personnel training programs and increased 
information for patients are being fostered. Hospital doctors may now choose 
between either full-time or part-time commitments, the latter being able to 
practice privately within the public system. Maximum waiting times have been 
set for treatment of several pathologies. Also, patients have become allowed to 
choose between providers, be it public or private, accredited by the regions. 
These providers are to be reimbursed on the basis of tariffs.
According to the 1992-93 reform, the government remains in charge of 
the definition of the national health plan. Also, the state is to guarantee the 
provision of a standard basic set of services for all residents, and is to allocate 
funds to the regions (based on capitation, interregional mobility, the state of 
infrastructures, and technological needs). The role of the executive is thus 
intensified vis a vis the parliament, in order to avoid the blocking of decisions 
that was the commonplace during the eighties. State transfers are not to cover all 
health expenditure, so that regions must collect themselves social contributions 
(taxes or co-payments) in order to finance their services. In this way, the reform 
includes incentives for cost-containment and efficiency by means of managed 
competition mechanisms (European Commission 1998). The 1992-93 reform 
has started to be implemented in 1994 and is still under way.
The crucial developments of the nineties have been possible because of 
the concurrence of several factors. In the first place, external pressures 
stemming from the Maastricht Treaty and the conditions to join the EMU were 
always in the background. Secondly, the reform of the electoral system towards 
a majoritarian model and the crisis of the traditional parties -due to corruption 
scandals and internal divisions— led to a situation of very intense renewal of the 
political elites. The parties included in the traditional Pentapartito that had 
formerly ruled the country almost disappeared. The repeated presence of 
“technical” cabinets in power during the nineties was also of crucial importance 
because their autonomy was enhanced by lack of partisan control. The 
amelioration of the public administration capacities also helped. All these moves 
resulted in higher stability allowing for a more agile decision-making process 
and to the passing of a large set of reforms aimed at financial adjustment and the 
meeting of the Maastricht criteria. Social policy changes were an important part 
of the adjusting endeavours (Ferrera and Gualmini 1998).
In sum, unlike the Portuguese and Greek cases, health care reform has 
taken place decidedly in Italy in two occasions. The implementation of the 1978 
reform was possible because of the existence of a strong coalition in favour of 




























































































of the deep dissatisfaction of the population with the existing system, and tl. 
weak position of the doctors and health funds. Attempts at rationalizing reforms 
during the eighties failed because of political instability, unable to cope with 
persistent economic imbalances. Finally, in the nineties, the already existing 
conscience on the malfunctioning and inequalities of the welfare system, 
together with pressures stemming form the European integration process, pushed 
in the direction of reform thanks to the attainment of a stable political 
environment.
In Spain, worries about the quick increase of health care expenditure 
began to intensify among political elites at the end of the eighties, so that they 
started to pay attention to the British White Paper. Expenditure growth in Spain 
during the second half of the eighties was substantial; in fact it was the highest 
in the European Union (European Commission 1995). The decentralization 
process was connected to this development for both the budgets of INSALUD- 
Direct Management and independent regional health care services were 
determined largely by past expenditure, which offered little incentives for 
restraint. In the late eighties, there was growing concern among policy-makers 
about mounting patient dissatisfaction, long waiting lists and inefficiencies in 
management. But the main worry was expenditure control.
This perception of the situation --the need to rationalize the system and to 
introduce cost control measures— was reinforced by the approval of the Catalan 
Law of Health Care in 1990, which included several internal market devices. As 
it was usually the case, an autonomous region was able to take innovative 
measures in advance of central state proposals. As early as January 1991 a 
parliamentary commission was appointed with the aim of assessing the 
introduction of cost control measures into the Spanish National Health Service. 
Seven months later the "Abril Report" —named so after the director of the 
Commission— was published.
The media reactions to the proposals of the Abril Report were 
disproportionate to the actual cost control measures it put forth. The proposal to 
introduce a ticket on pharmaceuticals for the previously exempted retired 
population was the factor triggering rejection of the whole report. Both the 
unions and the population showed their total refusal for any cuts concerning 
public health care services.
The rejection of the Abril reform proposals influenced the character of the 
policy-making process during the nineties. In Spain, in the early nineties, most 
of the reforms and cost-control measures introduced into the health care system 
have followed a hushed, tentative and piecemeal strategy. The approval of a 




























































































although being far from restrictive, can be considered as a disguised cost-control 
measure, for future inclusion of new services will have to be negotiated. 
Something similar can be said about the establishment of a negative list of 
pharmaceuticals in 1993 and 1997. The tentative introduction of prospective 
budgeting for hospitals, together with other rationalizing measures, have 
followed the same strategic principle. In fact, many of the proposals of the Abril 
Committee have been put in practice.
Regarding expenditure control, the Programa de Convergencia, 
established a reduction of spending on health care of 1% of GDP for the period 
1992 to 1996, which was further extended for four more years. Under the 
programme, the overall health care budget is linked explicitly to GDP growth. 
The allocation of funds to the regions is based largely on population, although 
the latest agreement reached in 1997 takes into account to a certain extent age 
composition, patient mobility and medical teaching costs. Regions have 
undertaken to avoid incurring deficits but have been given greater powers to 
levy taxes so as to supplement revenues from government, encouraging at the 
same time a more responsible attitude to expenditure growth (Cabiedes y 
Guillen 1997).
Measures aimed at increasing efficiency and the quality of care have 
differed from one region to the other. In Catalonia, and some other regions, 
contracts with GP co-operatives specifying terms for the supply of services have 
been developed together with the integration of primary care teams with 
hospitals. In Valencia, long-term monopoly concessions have been granted to 
private operators for the provision of hospital care. In 1993, the INSALUD- 
Direct Management has introduced a system of Contrato Programa (programme 
agreements) to regulate relations with hospitals. According to the INSALUD 
Strategic Plan (1998-2000), the introduction of quasi-markets has started in all 
the regions it is responsible for. Measures have also entailed the modification of 
the remuneration of doctors in order to make their contracts more flexible and 
allow for the intensification of hospital services (European Commission 1998; 
CES 1998).
Short after the Conservative Party gained office in March 1996, after 14 
years of Socialist rule, several measures were quickly approved. A decree was 
passed on the autonomy of management of health care institutions, thus opening 
the way for the re-organization of publicly operated hospitals into various types 
of public firms. The initial text of the decree was more radical and intended to 
allow for the conversion of public hospitals into private enterprises. The reaction 
of the Socialist opposition was so intense that the text of the decree was changed 
a day after its publication. So far, a good number of new hospitals have adopted 




























































































with greater managerial flexibility and autonomy, especially in the decentralized 
health systems (Catala and de Manuel Keenoy 1998). In April 1997 and 
December 1998, legal normative was passed allowing for the conversion of 
existing hospitals into public foundations, both at the INSALUD-Direct 
Management territory and within the regional independent services.
In Spain, very limited use has so far been made of direct charges, except 
in relation with prescribed drugs, for which a fee of 40% of the price has been 
charged since 1978 for users within active ages. A decree on the flexibilization 
of pharmaceutical services (opening hours and conditions for the establishment 
of new community pharmacies) was also passed in 1996 in order to increase 
competition among providers of pharmaceuticals. Market-style incentives to 
individual patient-based demand have consisted in Spain of the introduction of 
free choice of general physician and paediatricians since 1993 and, since 1994, 
of specialist doctors in the INSALUD territory. Specific measures have also 
been undertaken for the shortening of waiting lists, starting in 1996.
Measures introduced in the early nineties seem to have curbed 
expenditure growth (growth in real spending over the period 1990-95 averaged 
3% a year as opposed to over 8% a year over the preceeding five years) and 
have led to some incentive to increase efficiency. Still, problems remain over the 
formula to for allocating funds between regions, which needs to take proper 
account of underlying differences in patient characteristics. Most of the latest 
measures undertaken in Spain in the direction of rationalization of expenditure 
and increased managerial efficiency were fostered by the recommendations of a 
parliamentary commission formulated in 1997. However, one of its relevant 
proposals, i.e., that of achieving the legal recognition of the right to health care 
on the basis of citizenship, has not been undertaken.
In sum, the establishment of a national health service in Spain was 
attained in an incremental way. Some aspects have been more successful than 
others, as for example full financing via taxes and virtual universalization of 
coverage. It should be noted though, that coverage universalization has been 
attained de facto in Spain, but not de iure, for it has not been recognised as a 
citizenship right so far (Freire Campo 1998). The second wave of reform of the 
Spanish health care system, that proposed by the Abril Committee in 1991, was 
so clearly rejected that it fostered the adoption of a totally different political 
strategy. While the reform of the 80s was openly debated, most of the measures 
introduced in the system during the 90s were either put in practice in a silent 
way or in such a quick one that the social and political actors had hardly time to 
react. This was the case with the measures adopted by royal decree in 1996, 
soon after the Conservative government took office and with the latest 




























































































a very active opposition on the part of the Socialist Party, the unions and user's 
associations, which explains why any hints at the privatising of the NHS is very 
hard to pass.
One reason for explaining the negative reaction to the “reform of the 
reform” may relate to what could be labelled “developmental time”. Spain was 
the last Southern country to introduce a national health service in 1986, while 
this reform also meant a broad decentralization process. The cost containment 
proposals of the Abril Committee arrived five years later than the General 
Health Law and only three years after the official attainment of universal 
coverage. In short, and in comparison with other European countries were the 
process was much more smooth, the Spanish health care system had to face a 
concentration of developmental challenges in a very short period of time. Such a 
circumstance accounts both for the resistance against further change and also for 
some of the difficulties in the reform process. This could be argued to a greater 
extent also of the Portuguese and Greek case, were the concentration of 
developmental challenges has been even more demanding. As for the Italian 
case, cost-control measures and restructuring of management of the system were 
much more acute because of the development of a deep conscience among most 
political and social actors and the population in general of the existence of great 
imbalances and inequalities.
The exam of the “reform of the reform” shows that it has adopted very 
different profiles in Southern health care systems. A summary of reform 
measures can be found in table 2. While Italy has introduced radical changes on 
both the supply and the demand sides of health services decidedly, Spain has 
only touched them slightly. No co-payments (with the exception of the already 
existing one on pharmaceuticals) have been introduced in Spain, and only free 
choice of doctors within the public system has been enacted. Managed 
competition is now being introduced at the INSALUD-Direct Management 
territory, and it has also been established in some of the regional health care 
systems, the most salient case being that of Catalonia. These developments are 
due in both countries to the need to convey with the Maastricht and EMU 
criteria and the perception among policy-makers that internationalization 
pressures had to be met by balancing public accounts. However, while demand- 
side reforms affecting equity (above all increased cost-sharing) were possible in 
Italy due to welfare state de-legitimisation, the opposite took place in Spain, 
where socio-political actors and the electorate have remained much more 
committed to a universal model free of charge than their Italian counterparts so 
far. Thus, the set of reforms has focused on the supply side in Spain, where 




























































































Table 2 . Measures undertaken by Southern health care systems afTecting the demand 
side
Italy Spain Portugal Greece
Increased cost-sharing at the point of use X O X X
Increased cost-sharing for drugs X O X X
Market-style incentives to individual patient-based demand X X Xni P
Individual choice of insurer 0 0 Xni 0
affecting the supply side
Global budgeting X X X X
Removing services from public financing X 0 0 O
Modification of reimbursement for hospitals X X Xni P
Practice guidelinps X X P 0
Modification of remuneration of doctors X X P P
Turning hospital» into public firms X X Xexp P
Public sub-contracting of services by health institutions X X Xexp P
Increasing intensity of services X X P P
Legend: X=yes; 0=no; Xni=passed but not implemented; Xexp=pilot experiments; 
P=proposed
In the Portuguese and Greek cases, the “reform of the reform” has had a 
different character (see table 2). Because of lack of implementation of the first 
set of reforms and the persistence of heterogeneous systems of provision, the 
measures adopted have rather impinged on the demand side than on the supply 
one so far. Though not put in practice, Portugal is the only case having passed a 
reform entailing such a radical measure affecting demand of health care as 
allowing life-long individual choice of insurer. Demand-side reform has been 
focused on the increase of co-payments in both Portugal and Greece, although 
much more intensely in the former. As for the supply-side, most measures have 
been either only proposed or are starting to be timidly introduced. Moreover, 
despite the fact that these systems may use global budgeting as a means to 
control health expenditure in the public sector, the permanence of health funds 
and the broad private sector, pose difficulties for state action in this respect. 
Resistance on the part of powerful doctors' associations, who benefit from the 
overlapping of public and private sectors, is one of the main reasons for the lack 
of more decided changes on the supply sides of the Greek and Portuguese health 
care systems. Another reason stems from the fact that, although also suffering 
from pressures stemming from EU integration, conscience persists in these 





























































































Finally, the “reform of the reform” of Southern health care systems has 
been grounded to a significant extent on the British managed competition 
paradigm, proving the presence of policy-diffusion mechanisms. But how has all 
the reform process affected the structure of health care systems? The next 
session deals with changes in coverage spans of population and services, 
expenditure mechanisms and financing trends and re-organization of Southern 
health care systems.
3. THE IMPACT OF THE REFORM PROCESS
In accordance with the gradual introduction of national health services in 
Southern European countries, the coverage span has become formally universal 
in all of them. Within the domain of the European Union, the majority of 
countries have established universal coverage irrespective of whether the chosen 
model is a social insurance system or a national health service. The only 
exceptions are Germany and the Netherlands, for in the rest of the member states 
coverage rates exceed the 98 per cent threshold (see table 3).
While Southern European health care systems coverage rates were well 
below the average for the EU-15 (with the exception of Italy) in 1960, the 
differences were much narrower in the mid seventies. The gap was closed 
during the following decades, so that in 1995 all four countries exceeded the 
European Union average (see graph 1 in the annex). When compared to other 
social security health care systems, such as those of Germany, France and 
Belgium, coverage rates also show smaller figures in Southern countries (Italy 
excluded) till the moment in which national health services were introduced (see 




























































































Table 3: Health care coverage. European Union (1960-1995)














































































































































Source: OECD Health Data, 1998
Despite these general trends, the evolution of Southern countries as regards 
coverage rates for health care has differed among them. Italy has always shown 
coverage rates higher that the EU average for the whole period (1960-1995). On 
the other extreme, Portugal had the lowest coverage rates within the EU until the 
second half of the seventies, when the national health service was created. 
Coverage rates in Spain and Greece have grown more incrementally from the 
sixties to the nineties, but while Greece kept under the figures for Spain until the 
late seventies, the situation was reversed thereafter, so that Greece attained full 
coverage six years before Spain (see graph 1 in the annex).
However, these data may be misleading. The prevalence of some of the 
traits of the previous social security model may be ascertained all four Southern 
countries, although to different degrees, so that formal and actual coverage rates 
differ. In 1978, Italy included the whole resident population within the national 
health service. In Spain, coverage reaches 99.7% of the population. However, 
two important peculiarities should be pointed out in this latter case. On the one 
hand, a population group consisting of roughly 200,000 people included in the 
highest income bracket do not have rights to public health care services (Freire 
Campo 1993, 79). On the other hand, health services for civil servants are 
managed by independent mutual associations. Civil servants have the right to 
choose between either public or private provision, in both cases publicly 




























































































The situation in Portugal and Greece regarding the coverage span of 
health care services differs substantially from that of Italy and Spain. In 
Portugal, occupational compulsory insurance schemes for public sector 
employees remained in place during the eighties. With the privatization of major 
public firms some of these insurance funds shifted to the private sector. Still, 
insurance for civil servants and the military remained in the public sector 
(around 18% of the population). Moerover, several sources show that around 
one quarter of the population has no effective access to the NHS (Pinto 1997, 
142).
The Greek health care system is also distant form the NHS model. Access 
is still divided into two broad subsystems, i.e., IKA for urban areas and OGA for 
rural ones. There exist many other insurance programs of a smaller entity. And, 
what is more relevant, services and conditions of access vary among the 
different insurance schemes differ (Matsaganis 1991). The main effect of the 
1983 reform was the nationalization of the hospital sector. This meant that the 
non-insured became entitled to hospital services as a citizen's right. Elderly 
people depending on a social pension are insured by OGA for both primary and 
hospital care. The so-called “certified poor” are covered by the public system in 
the same terms as the civil servants. IKA has also decided to insure the 
unemployed youth that are too old to be covered by their parent's insurance. All 
in all, the situation in Greece is such that everybody has access to public health 
care of some sort, but for some that merely means access to public hospitals, 
because of the lack of development of public primary care.
As for the services provided by Southern European health care services, 
and despite the existence of some differences, the public health systems in the 
EU are very similar in the extent of services provided (European Commission 
1995; MISSOC 1997). Spain constitutes an exception within the EU for, in 
1995, a decree was passed consisting of a detailed and explicit list of health 
services provided and financed by the NHS. Additionally, services not covered 
by public provision were singled out in a negative list, which was not restrictive 
(Guillen and Cabiedes 1997). In Italy, lists of drugs and treatments that can be 
prescribed have been drawn up recently and also the publication of Service 
Charters has been made compulsory (European Commission 1998).
In Portugal, private provision of health care services is still very broad. 
The NHS provides for most hospital stays, primary services and mother and 
child care, while dental care, laboratory tests and X-Rays are supplied by the 
private sector in very large proportions. These latter services are usually 
reimbursed to patients (Pinto 1997, 143; Pereira et al. 1997, 4). The private 




























































































Another relevant characteristic of South European health care systems regards 
the relations between the public and the private sectors. As Ferrera (1996, 24) 
notes, while traditional national health services have placed most physical health 
care resources under the public domain, Southern systems have not strengthened 
enough their public networks so as to crowd out private provision. Moreover, 
peculiar relations have arisen between the public and the private sectors: 
national health services contract out services to private centres. The proportions 
of public expenditure being dedicated to provision by private centres amounted 
to almost 40 per cent in Portugal in 1987 and to 37.5 per cent in Italy in 1989, 
having decreased to 25 per cent in 1994 in this latter country. In Spain, 
conciertos (contracts with private providers) amount to around 11 per cent of 
public expenditure, while in Greece it is estimated that it reaches 27%.
As regards expenditure trends, growth of expenditure on health care as a 
percentage of GDP has been much more marked in Southern European countries 
than the average for the European Union during the eighties and nineties. 
Growth took place mainly in the second half of the eighties in Italy and Spain, 
while Portugal and Greece witnessed dramatic increases in the early nineties 
(see table 4 and graph 3 in the annex). The only exception is Italy in the nineties, 
where a considerable decrease took place thanks to the introduction of severe 
cost-control measures. In general, this has resulted in a process of approximation 
to EU standards in expenditure, so that public expenditure on sickness as a 
percentage of GDP was, in 1997, of 5.3 for Italy, 5.8 for Spain, 4.9 for Portugal, 
and 4.3 for Greece (El5 average 6.5%) (OECD Health Data 1998).
In 1993, expenditure on sickness per resident in relation to GDP per head 
was close to the E12 average in all Southern countries except Greece, whose 
expenditure was by far the lowest in the EU. Only the Netherlands, France and 
Germany were above the E12 average (European Commission 1995, 73). This is 
proof of the narrowing of the gap between Southern countries (maybe with the 
exception of Greece) and their European counterparts in expenditure levels 




























































































Table 4: Public expenditure on health care (% of GDP)
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Austria 3,1 3,5 3,3 5,1 5,1 5,4 5,6 5,7
Belgium 2,2 3,0 3,7 5,5 6.2 6,2 7,1 6,7
Denmark 3,8 5,0 5,4 5,6 7,9 7,2 7,1 5,0
Finland 2,3 4,0 4,4 5,5 5,4 6,0 7,4 5,6
France 3,0 3,9 4,7 5,4 6,3 6,5 7,0 7,7
Germany 3,0 4,1 5,3 6,8 7,1 7,1 7,8 8.1
Greece 1,6 1.8 1,9 2,5 3,3 3,4 3,4 4,3
Ireland 2,9 3,8 4,8 5,8 6,5 5,4 5,5 5,3
Italy 3,1 4,1 5,3 4,9 5.5 5,7 6,5 5,3
Luxembourg 5,2 5,8 6,1 6,1 6,5
Netherlands 2,1 3,7 4,7 5,5 6,3 6,0 6,8 6,1
Portugal 0,8 1,2 2,1 3,4 3,4 3,5 4,4 4,9
Spain 1.0 1,9 3,0 4,2 4,7 4,5 5,8 5,8
Sweden 3,5 5,2 6,5 8,3 8,8 7,9 7,7 7,1
UK 3,4 3,9 4,1 4,8 5,1 5,0 5,9 5,7
EU Average 2,6 3,5 4,2 5,2 5,8 5,7 6,3 6,1
Source: OECD Health Data 1998
Table 5: Per capita health expenditure, ECUs, PPP
1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 419 588 835 1119
Belgium 428 675 1047 1359
Denmark 590 877 1107 1370
Finland 359 623 985 952
France 492 778 1081 1478
Germany 456 708 922 1551
Greece 137 217 300 496
Ireland 329 418 523 835
Italy 415 598 974 970
Luxembourg 500 743 1313 1786
Netherlands 453 650 913 1248
Portugal 149 194 379 577
Spain 231 343 606 763
Sweden 701 988 1266 1233
UK 356 535 754 969
EU Average 401 596 867 1114
Source: OECD Health Data, 1998
Conversely, public health care expenditure per head in ECUs at purchasing 
power parities was still, and with the exception of Italy, well below the EU 
average in the rest of the Southern countries (see table 5 and graphs 4 and 5). 
Nevertheless, growth in health expenditure per head was significantly higher 




























































































and Greece. This is proof of the trend towards the narrowing of the differences 
among the less developed health care systems of the South and their European 
counterparts (European Commission 1998, 131).
Table 6: Public expenditure on health care over total
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Austria 69,8 75,4 75,9 73,3 72,0
Belgium 83,6 85,9 83,1 88,9 87,6
Denmark 84,7 88,8 87,9 86,7 65,0
Finland 78,8 80,0 79,6 79,6 77,0
France 77,0 79,0 76,4 74,6 78,4
Germany 78,7 78,3 77,6 78,5 77,4
Greece 73,7 91,3 79,6 76,1 74,8
Ireland 79,5 80,5 73,1 75,1 75,0
Italy 86,8 78,7 77,7 76,3 69,9
Luxembourg 91,4 93,0 93,0 92,8 91,8
Netherlands 74,0 76,0 73,6 77,4 72,0
Portugal 70,0 56,2 51,5 59,6 60,0
Spain 75,6 79,4 79,7 78,7 78,7
Sweden 91,3 91,6 89,9 87,2 83,3
UK 90,0 87,6 84,6 84,5 84,5
EU Average 80,3 81,4 78,9 79,3 76,5
Source: OECD Health Data 1998
Another measure indicating successful conversion into national health services 
is that of public expenditure on health over total. In this case, once again 
Southern countries show significant differences. Portugal has the lowest share of 
public health care expenditure in GDP among the 15 EU countries. In 1997, 
60% of health care expenditure was public in Portugal, while Italy reached 70%, 
and Greece and Spain spent 75% and 79% respectively. The proportions were 
not much higher in the traditional national health services: 84.5% in the UK; 
83.3% in Sweden; 65.0% in Denmark and 77.0% in Finland (see table 6). When 
compared to the EU average, public expenditure on health over total in Southern 
countries is at the same level or even higher from the seventies to the nineties, 
with the clear exception of Portugal, where it is much lower (see graph 6 in the 
annex).
Differences among Southern countries are also notorious regarding the 
financial sources of the cost of health care. In Spain, public financing of the 
health budget has occurred, each time to a larger extent, through state revenues 
that have come to represent 92% in 1997. Moreover, it is foreseen that it reaches 
100% in 1999, so as to comply with the provisions of the 1995 Toledo Pact 




























































































health care systems. In Italy, the shift has showed a much smaller entity until 
1997 when contributions still account for almost half of total revenue (European 
Commission 1998). However, in 1998, it was decided that the Italian system 
was to be financed totally out of taxes, 30% of them constituting transfers from 
the central state and 70% regional revenues. In Greece, hospitals are financed 
broadly by tax revenues whereas outpatient care remains financed by the 
insurance funds, so that estimations for 1998 state that almost half of public 
health expenditure is financed out of taxes. In Portugal, the NHS is neither 
financed mainly out of general taxation. In 1991, taxes amounted to 55.2% of 
total health care financing, while the share of social insurance contributions was 
of 6.0%, and that of private payments of 38.8% (Pereira et al. 1997).
From the financial side, Ferrera (1996) notes that that none of the 
Southern European health systems share the tax-financing approach typically 
followed by the British and Scandinavian health services. The relevance of 
public expenditure versus private health expenditure, as well as its financing 
through taxes, seems consistent with the concept of equity within a national 
health service. However, differences among Southern countries are notorious in 
this respect, as noted above. It should also be noted that the cost is not financed 
totally out of taxes in some traditional health care systems. For example, in the 
United Kingdom in 1989, 79% of the cost of the NHS was financed by general 
tax revenues, and 16% through insurance contributions. In Finland, the 
proportion of tax financing reaches around 80% since 1972 (Saltman and 
Figueras 1997, 122). These percentages are lower than that of the Spanish or 
Italian NHS.
The proportion of user co-payments also varies a lot among Southern 
European health care systems. As Pinto (1997, 143) notes, the Portuguese health 
care system has never been free at the point of use. Patients using public 
services have to pay flat rate co-payments for consultations and diagnostic tests. 
Tickets on pharmaceuticals also exist. For those depending on insurance 
schemes the situation is different for they are able to purchase care wherever 
they wish, be it the NHS, contracted services or private ones. Insurance funds 
pay for contracted services on a fee-per-item basis. Private services are either 
reimbursed to users or co-financed by their respective insurance funds. In 1995, 
consumers paid out of their pockets more than 45% of all expenditures in health 
care, the highest value in all OECD countries (OECD Health Data 1998).
After the 1983 reform, and especially after the 1993 one, Italy has also 
introduced a lot of tickets. Cost-sharing affects diagnostic procedures in public 
hospitals and specialist visits. In order to curb down expenditure, charges have 
been raised significantly by the central government in the 90s, and also by some 




























































































in Italy (this figure includes co-payments). User’s contributions are lowest in 
Spain and Greece. In Spain, they only exist for pharmaceuticals. In Greece, no 
co-payment exists for inpatient hospital care, the rest of the tickets being low. 
Some funds have co-insurance for diagnostic services (Abel Smith and 
Mossialos 1994).
The labour regime of health professionals in the public sector has also 
remained peculiar in Southern Europe. Significant proportions of them work in 
public consultations in the morning, as salaried civil servants, and in private 
practice in the afternoon, on a fee-per-item of service or a contractual basis. 
Incentives such as an extra payment have been introduced in some of the 
systems in order to assure that health professionals are only working for the 
public system. However, incentives do not avoid the overlapping between the 
public and the private sectors. In fact, the same patient is sometimes treated in a 
public institution in the morning receiving a lower standard of care, and treated 
again by the same practitioner in a private setting in the afternoon, receiving 
then a better attention. However, this peculiarity of Southern systems should be 
further researched. There are no reliable data available on the numbers of 
physicians that work both for the public and the private sectors. It is estimated 
that the proportions are of 15% in Italy, 20% in Spain and Greece, and 50% in 
Portugal. Thus it is difficult to make a comparison with the traditional national 
health services and to figure out whether this aspect can be considered as a 
salient feature of Southern health care systems. It is equally difficult to find out 
whether there is a homogeneous pattern of such practices in all Mediterranean 
countries, although the size of the private sector in Portugal and Greece as 
compared to Italy and Spain makes one think that overlapping is much more 
severe in the former.
In sum, and in general, it can be defended that the Southern Model as 
defined by Ferrera (1996) has persisted to a great extent regarding the macro- 
institutional characteristics of Southern European health care systems, although 
some caveats should be pointed out. Coverage entitlements remain not fully 
homogeneous, although heterogeneity is minimal in Italy, little pronounced in 
Spain, and very broad in Portugal and Greece. Financing out of taxes also shows 
disparities, being maximum in Spain and Italy, and relatively low in comparison 
with the traditional national health services in the rest of the Southern countries, 
where is reaches roughly to half of the public budget. The proportion of public 
expenditure over total expenditure on health care does not diverge significantly 
from that of traditional health care services, at least according to OECD data, 
and with the exception of Portugal. Still, the perverse overlap between the public 
and the private sectors persists. However, this relationship has been rephrased in 
a very different way in Portugal and Greece as compared with the evolution in 




























































































seems to have lost some of its defining and differentiating characteristics in 
Spain and Italy, when compared to the traditional British and Scandinavian 
national health services. Portugal and Greece are following a different 
evolutionary pattern that does not allow to classify them merely as less 
developed national health services or health insurance systems, for they have 
become a mixture of them in which the private sector plays a very relevant role.
Finally, cost-control measures have clearly had an effect on expenditure 
levels in Italy, where expenditure over GDP has sharply decreased, and to a 
lesser extent in Spain, where it has decelerated. Expenditure in Greece and 
Portugal continues to grow as a percentage of GDP and in per capita purchasing 
power parities. It is only too early to evaluate whether market incentives and 
entrepreneurial devices included in the “reform of the reforms” have rendered 
Southern health care systems more efficient. Also, reforms are too recent to 
know whether they have produced an impact on equity levels.
i Something can be said about the devolution process that has taken place
in Italy and Spain, having supposed a dramatic change in the organization and 
management of the systems. An attempt was done in Greece in very recent years 
with no success so far (Venieris 1997a). In January 1993, a law was passed in 
Portugal establishing five health regions with maximum autonomy. These five 
administrative health regions were to substitute the previously existing eighteen 
ones. The law foresaw that “units of health” comprising all health centres and 
hospitals of each health area would be created (OECD 1994). So far, there is 
little information on how this process has evolved, but it has entailed 
centralization rather than the opposite.
Both in Spain and Italy, the decentralization processes were foreseen in 
the Constitutions. In Spain, the process began in 1981, when capacities were 
devolved to Catalonia. Between that date and the present, seven regions have 
received capacities, while ten of them have remained under the control of the 
National Institute for Health Services), so that central authorities manage health 
care for around 40 per cent of the population currently. Conversely, in Italy, the 
process of decentralization was carried out all at once for all the regions in 1978, 
at the same time as the national health service was created. In both countries, 
there exist “special status” regions enjoying a broader range of capacities and 
“ordinary status” ones, which makes the functioning of the system complex.
In Spain, the devolution thrust has rendered both assets and liabilities. 
Organizational and institutional change has been greatly enhanced, so that 
central services have followed in many cases innovations introduced at the 
regional level. For example, the Basque Country and Valencia introduced 




























































































Management. Decentralized health care services were also the first to establish 
individual health cards to substitute the pre-existent ones held by heads of 
families. However, decentralization has also resulted in a significant increase of 
expenditure. Moreover, from the point of equity, although territorial differences 
were present before the devolution process started, they have been accentuated 
ever since. Regional financing of health care remains one of the most delicate 
issues and agreements are difficult to reach (Cabiedes and Guillén 1997). The 
main source of financing is a block grant transferred by the central government 
according mainly to capitation criteria. The latest pact on regional financing, 
signed in 1997, only contemplates in a limited way differences among regions in 
age structures of the population, morbidity and mortality patterns and other 
causes of health care expenditure.
In Italy, decentralization has also brought about innovation and 
expenditure increases, growing differences among the regions and welfare 
tourism. As France (1995) points out, one of the central problems of the Italian 
NHS was the lack of co-ordination (“weak vertical hierarchy”) among the three 
tiers of government, i.e., the central authorities, the regions and the local health 
units. Thus, tensions among the different governing bodies have been the 
commonplace in recent times, with central authorities accusing the health units 
of overspending and acting inefficiently, and the latter claiming that the budgets 
are systematically underestimated. This situation was radically changed by the 
reform of 1993-94. This problem of confrontation between financers and 
revenue raisers, on the one hand, and spenders/deliveres, on the other is still the 
case in Spain. This is why in both countries current reform points to an 
increased fiscal co-responsibility, so that accountability and transparency is 





























































































Several reasons account for the introduction of national health services in 
Southern Europe. In the first place, the passing of reforms was eased by the 
processes of democratization that Southern countries started around the mid 
seventies. This was the case of Portugal, Spain and Greece. Legitimisation needs 
of the new regimes and an already existing consensus among the population and 
socio-political actors constituted a powerful reason for expansionary reform. 
Moreover, democratization allowed interest groups to exercise pressure. Reform 
itself took place very quickly in Portugal, only five years after the overturn of 
the authoritarian regime. This was due to the radical character of its transition to 
democracy, while the attainment of consensus needed some more time in Greece 
and Spain.
Secondly, the perception of the existence of broad inequalities in health 
care resources among regions, of mounting differences among the insurance 
funds, and of lack of co-ordination among the numerous administrative 
departments in charge of the provision of health care also opened the way for the 
reform. Change was also fostered by the idea that welfare services were to reach 
European levels and all the population should benefit from it. In all countries, 
conscience grew on the fact that developments during the 70s had early 80s had 
rendered privileged groups in an ever better position vis a vis the health system. 
It was thought that the establishment of a national health service would smooth 
out all these inequalities.
Thirdly, the presence of left-wing parties in office when reforms were 
enacted was also of significant importance. Such parties were very keen on the 
idea that welfare services (not necessarily cash transfers), should become 
universal. In the Italian case, a country already enjoying democracy since the 
post-war period, reform was possible by the formation of a strong coalition in 
favour of reform: the unions, the regions and the left, especially the Communist 
Party. The weakening of the medical profession due to increasing 
bureaucratization and to internal conflicts and the gradual loss of credibility and 
viability of the health funds helped in the same direction. The role played by the 
health funds and the doctor's associations was radically different in the 
Portuguese and Greek cases, for even though they could not effectively oppose 
the passing of the reform, they strongly disagreed with it. Health care reform 
was less radical in Spain than in Italy, due to the absence of such a strong 
coalition in favour of reform as the Italian one.
Finally, the pressure exercised by the regions is another element of 




























































































Portugal and Greece, on the other, for this actor was absent in the latter. Spanish 
and Italian regions were one of the key actors who made pressure for reform, 
because the introduction of a national health service was coupled with 
decentralization of the systems, which would allow them to play a protagonist 
role in the direction and provision of health care. As soon as they were bom, 
regions began to fight against the central administration in order to force it to 
accomplish the transfer of responsibilities over health matters foreseen by the 
Constitutions.
But, which were the factors allowing for implementation of reform in 
Italy and Spain, and for its partial failure in Greece and Portugal? Economic 
conditions in subsequent years from the introduction of the reforms were of 
crucial importance. Additionally, preparations for joining the European 
Community and actually having to act as members of it also eased 
implementation in Spain and Greece, and less so in Portugal. This new political 
status helped the introduction of expansionary measures in order to meet EC 
recommendations and to narrow the gap with the more developed European 
welfare states. It should not be forgotten though that proposals of reform and 
consensus on the introduction of national health services was reached in 
Portugal, Spain and Greece much before becoming a member of the EC was 
even at stake.
In Italy, implementation was almost immediate to the passing of the law 
because of the existence of a strong coalition in favour of it. Contrarily, Greece 
met many difficulties for implementation, above all because a stable coalition of 
interest behind it was not achieved and the necessary public funds needed to put 
it into practice were not allocated. Moreover, health funds were not suppressed. 
Resistance on the part of doctors and frontal opposition by the insurance funds, 
especially the better off ones, were the main forces impeding a more decided 
implementation process. In the Portuguese case, doctors have also successfully 
resisted change.
Another possible reason for difficulties at implementation in Greece and 
Portugal may stem from the fact that coverage was much lower in Portugal, and 
also a bit lower in Greece than in Italy and Spain. The continued presence of 
conservative governments in Portugal during the second half of the eighties and 
early nineties may also explain difficulties at putting into practice a universalist 
reform. In Greece, the PASOK was in power from 1981 to 1989, but, after that, 
alternation with the conservatives rendered continuity at reform problematic. 
This situation diverges with the experience of Spain, where the Socialist Party 




























































































Explaining difficulties at reform implementation and the consequent 
differences with the traditional national health services still existing in Southern 
countries may relate to what could be labelled “developmental time”. Southern 
countries had not completed full expansion of their social security health care 
systems when the oil-shocks came about, thus rendering any expansionary 
reform difficult. Moreover, shortly after, they had to implement their 
universalist reforms almost at the same time as pressures from the process of 
European integration and the internationalization of the economy began to grow. 
This meant that cost-control measures had to be introduced much before the 
reforms leading to the introduction of national health services had been put in 
practice, thus leading to a problematic and difficult situation. More significantly, 
the economic, political and social conditions of their inception are very different 
from the ones present in Britain or the Nordic countries.
As for the second wave of reforms, pressures stemming from the 
Maastricht treaty and internationalization of the economy have affected all 
Southern countries and led them to the introduction of rationalizing reforms. The 
need to balance the economy has pushed all of them to incorporate measures in 
the line of cost-control and managed competition, emulating somewhat the 
present paradigm on health care reform. All these moves have varied in intensity 
among Southern countries due to internal politics and to the situation inherited 
from the previous reform.
The exam of macro-institutional characteristics of health care system in 
Southern Europe shows that differences still exist between the South and the 
traditional national health services, although these differences are decreasing. 
Also, a lot of differences may be ascertained among Southern health care 
systems themselves, differences that seem to be deepening in recent years. 
While Italy and Spain are walking decidedly on the road towards national health 
services, the private sector seems to be gaining relevance in Portugal and Greece 
while social insurance continues to exist. Thus, the Southern model of welfare, 
at least in what regards health care, does not appear homogeneous. This exam 
has also shown that it is difficult to continue considering Southern health care 
systems as belonging to a “rudimentary” model of welfare, as Leibfried (1993) 
has labelled them, when the levels of expenditure, the coverage spans and the 
array of services provided are considered.
As for the “reform of the reform”, while Italy has acted on both the supply 
and demand sides of health services, Spain has put the accent on the supply side 
though more timidly, and Portugal and Greece mainly on the demand side. How 
these sets of programs are going to affect the equity and efficiency levels of 
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